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The international trade of nuclear power plants is usually studied from 
a demand perspective. Which new countries are willing to access to this 
technology? How the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe has changed the 
market forecasts? What risks of proliferation new entrants entail? This 
paper takes an opposite direction. It looks at the structure and the organ-
ising of the supply side. Which countries are the major exporters? How 
their ranking has changed? Is the nuclear export industry becoming a 
global industry? Part 1 provides a short description of the worldwide mar-
ket. Surprisingly, its size is modest and the US only plays a minor role. 
This part also provides a view on the relationship between domestic and 
export markets. Part 2 discusses the industrial organization of the nuclear 
industry. It compares the nuclear industry with the armament industry 
and the oil and gas supplies and services. Part 3 concludes in analysing the 
conditions nuclear industry could become a global industry.
1. NATIONAL MARKET AND EXPORTING 
PERFORMANCES
1.1. A small market
International trade in nuclear goods is a small market. This may seem sur-
prising as public attention often focuses on large contracts for the sale of 
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power plants costing tens of billions of euros. Understandably the news that 
the South Korean consortium led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
had won the $20-billion tender to build four reactors in the United Arab 
Emirates made a powerful impression. But the payments for such contracts 
are spread out over about 10 years – the time it takes to build the plant – and, 
above all, there are very few large contracts of this nature. In 2000-10 the 
global export market amounted to orders for two new reactors a year, some 
awarded following a call for tenders, others by mutual agreement (US GAO, 
2010). Furthermore a nuclear power plant is a complex assembly comprising a 
pressure vessel, steam generators, piping and a control room, associated with 
equipment for generating electricity with steam. As with any thermal power 
plant, it is necessary to install turbines, alternators, capacitors and such. The 
nuclear island – the specifically nuclear part of a plant – accounts for roughly 
half its cost, with the conventional part making up the rest. Thus reduced to 
its essentials, the global reactor market is worth less than €5 billion a year.
However, to this relatively low figure for annual sales of new reactors 
must be added trade in uranium, fuel, maintenance services, spare parts, 
reprocessing of spent fuel and waste management. These specifically 
nuclear up and down-stream activities multiply by three the value of the 
world market (WNA, 2012). For integrated companies, such as Areva or 
Rosatom, which cover the whole cycle, business connected to building new 
reactors represents, at the most, only one-fifth of total revenue. Up and 
down-stream activities are crucial for such companies, for they are recur-
rent and profitable. They are also less erratic than orders for new equip-
ment, less subject to intense competition (OECD/NEA, 2008). The opera-
tors and owners of nuclear power plants are to a large extent tied by their 
inputs to the company which built the reactor. For reasons of compatibil-
ity, know-how and technical information, the vendor has a competitive 
advantage over other suppliers of enriched fuel, spare parts and mainte-
nance services. It enjoys market power allowing it to increase prices, and 
thus profits. Industrial economists, who focus on markets for complemen-
tary goods (printers and ink cartridges, razors and blades, coffee machines 
and pods) are familiar with this mechanism (Carlton & Waldman, 2002). 
The first item is sold at cost price, or perhaps even subsidized, but the sup-
plier makes up the initial loss on sales of recurring products1.
1 Anne Lauvergeon, former Areva CEO and well known for being plain-spoken, cited 
the pods invented by Nestlé in 2008: ‘Our model is Nespresso, we sell coffee machines 
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1.2. The US decline
On the supply side, the US dominated the international market for many 
years. Until the mid-1970s three-quarters of the plants built elsewhere, were 
either built by US firms or under licence (Piram, 2009). But this dominant 
position subsequently crumbled. Its share has dropped to less than a quar-
ter of all the reactors built in the past 20 years. By value, the US accounts 
(US GAO, 2010) for less than 10% of global exports of nuclear equipment 
(reactors, large components and small parts), and about 10% of materials 
(natural uranium and plutonium). Indeed it has become a net importer, 
amounting to $15 billion a year. Meanwhile Canada, Russia and France have 
increased their market share (Finon, 2014). The first two export their pro-
prietary reactor technology; France too, though its technology was orig-
inally derived from US imports. South Korea recently joined the nuclear 
exporters’ club, taking a similar route gradually to achieve technological 
independence (Nam, 2013). Japan is poised to do likewise. Its nuclear engi-
neering companies have responded to calls to tender by new entrants such 
as Turkey and Vietnam. Former General Electric and Westinghouse licen-
sees, they have gone further than their French and Korean counterparts, 
purchasing the nuclear assets of the two US companies2.
The decline in US nuclear sales abroad is not due to the arrival of more 
powerful competitors, rather to the collapse of domestic demand. From 
the mid-1970s to the end of the 2010s not a single contract was signed 
for a new nuclear power plant in the US. Engineering firms have had to 
weather more than 30 years without any domestic demand, preceded by 
years of uncertain profits sapped by the vicissitudes of regulatory pres-
sure, with a major accident in 1979 (Three Mile Island) to crown it all 
(Joskow & Parsons, 2009). Enough to floor any industrial operation. The 
decline at home led to a massive loss of industrial capacity and skills in 
enrichment, the manufacture of large forged parts and construction engi-
neering. On the other hand reactor R&D and design has survived and is 
and the coffee to go with them. And coffee is very profitable.’ Le Point, 10 December 
2010, http://www.lepoint.fr/economie/areva-un-geant-de-l-atome-de-la-mine-d-ura-
nium-au-traitement-des-dechets-10-12-2010-1273598_28.php?
2 Hitachi holds an 80% share of GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy, a company resulting from 
the merger of the two companies’ nuclear interests. Toshiba acquired Westinghouse 
in 2006 over which it has enjoyed full control since 2012.
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still of first-class quality. The first new reactors to be built on US soil are 
Westinghouse AP 1000s. In 2006 China ordered four of these innovative 
next-generation reactors. General Electric has developed advanced boiling-
water reactors too. So the US still features in new nuclear and the interna-
tional market thanks to innovation and technology transfer. Westinghouse 
now sells brainpower rather than equipment. It is still earning money 
thanks to licence fees. For example it received its share of fees on the con-
struction of the four Kepco reactors in the UAE (Berthélemy & Lévêque, 
2011). The export version of this reactor still contains parts which belong 
to Westinghouse, including the software which controls the nuclear chain 
reaction in the reactor core. In short, the nuclear industry still operating 
in the US no longer comprises many factories and is partly controlled by 
Japanese firms, but it is still alive and profitable.
1.3. Domestic market and exports
In general the state of a nuclear engineering firm’s domestic market and 
its export potential are very closely connected (Lévêque, 2013). Just as 
with the US, it is difficult to enjoy a significant share of the export mar-
ket, without at the same time building nuclear power plants at home. The 
industrial fabric is not responsive enough, highly trained staff are not 
available in sufficient numbers and the technical skills are lacking. Oddly 
enough, when a domestic market is enjoying powerful growth, there is 
also less scope for exports: all efforts are focused on success on the home 
front, meeting deadlines, coordinating production and construction. 
China is a good example of this point. It is currently building 28 reactors 
at various places in the People’s Republic. Bearing in mind that the man-
ufacture of heavy engineering parts is scheduled several years ahead of 
the construction project, winning foreign contracts would mean reallocat-
ing manufacturing output originally intended for the home market. This 
would slow down the national programme and delay the projected supply 
of additional electricity. So the ideal situation for exports is somewhere 
between non-existent and booming domestic demand. This is the case 
in Russia, which has exported the largest number of reactors in the past 
15 years. Unlike the US, work building new capacity never stopped, though 
new orders were temporarily shelved in the aftermath of Chernobyl and 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Exports to Iran, China and India helped 
compensate for the momentary drop in demand at home. Ten new reactors 
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are at present being built in the Russian Federation, and since the end of 
the 2000s additional contracts have been signed with India and China, 
but also Turkey and Vietnam. Another case in point is South Korea. Much 
as in many other sectors this country has succeeded in developing a top-
grade national nuclear industry in a very short time. Initially output 
catered exclusively for the domestic market, building a fleet of reactors, 
which now numbers 23 and supplies a third of the country’s electricity. 
The aim is to reach 60% by 2030. There is little likelihood of the fleet grow-
ing any more. South Korea is a small island, in electrical terms, with no 
scope for selling surplus output to either its neighbour in the north, or 
Japan. So without exports there is no room for South Korea’s nuclear engi-
neering industry to expand further, or even maintain its present size. Just 
as it has done in shipbuilding, car manufacture or consumer electronics, 
it must export or die. It scored its first success with the UAE and it very 
much hopes others will follow soon.
2. WHICH MODEL: THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY, 
OR OIL AND GAS SUPPLIES AND SERVICES?
The nuclear industry is very similar to defence procurement in many 
respects, but in the future it could resemble oil and gas supplies and ser-
vices. In addition to the reasons cited above, the international nuclear 
market is small because individual states keep their orders for national 
industry, just as for arms. They give priority to technology that is either 
indigenous (Canada, Russia) or was originally licensed but has subse-
quently been developed locally (France, South Korea). In the immediate 
future, it is hard to imagine Russian or South Korean utilities issuing 
an international call to tender for the construction of a nuclear power 
plant on their home ground. China today and India tomorrow – if the lat-
ter launches an ambitious construction programme – also rely primarily 
on national firms and their own reactor models. The international mar-
ket is thus restricted to the delivery of the first plants to be built by one 
of the main new entrants – in other words countries which will subse-
quently develop their own fleet – and to supplies to countries which will 
never possess more than a few units. In both cases, a certain proportion 
of local content is one of the factors determining the outcome of a tender. 
The market is more open for large engineering components. EDF recently 
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purchased 45 steam generators, worth an estimated €1.5 billion, to refur-
bish its plants, entrusting a quarter of the order to Westinghouse and the 
rest to its traditional French supplier Areva. As there is only limited global 
capacity for producing the pressure vessels fitted to the largest reactors, 
two China’s AP 1000s are fitted with boilers manufactured by Doosan, of 
South Korea, whereas the French EPRs being built in Finland and China 
will use pressure vessels made by Japan Steel Works.
2.1. Similarities with the arms industry
Another feature reminiscent of the arms industry is the active involvement 
of government in export contracts. Ministers and even heads of state inter-
vene at a diplomatic level, but also meddle in finance, strategy and even 
organization. The UAE tender is emblematic in this respect. By 2009 two 
national consortiums remained in the running for the contract to build the 
Barakah nuclear power plant. One, led by Kepco, brought together Doosan 
for the steam-supply system, Hyundai for civil engineering, Korea Hydro 
and Nuclear Power for system engineering and Korea Power Engineering 
for design. The rival team, led by Areva, consisted of the utility GDF-Suez, 
turbine manufacturer Alstom, oil company Total and civil engineering spe-
cialist Vinci. Each consortium enjoyed the political and diplomatic back-
ing of their respective head of state. Mr Sarkozy and Mr Lee Myung Bak 
visited Abu Dhabi several times to persuade UAE President Sheikh Khalifa 
bin Zayed al-Nahyan to choose their champion. To clinch the deal they 
offered financing facilities to the buyer, a move that seems almost laugha-
ble given the UAE’s ample liquidity. The Import-Export Bank of Korea sub-
sequently took out an international loan to fund half the project, no doubt 
borrowing at a higher rate than UAE banks would have obtained. The two 
political leaders very probably offered additional sweeteners. It is common-
place for large nuclear contracts to be associated with offers of military 
assistance, arms sales or infrastructure development projects, but such 
information is not always made public. Regarding the Korean bid, the only 
detail which leaked to the press3 was that a battalion had been promised by 
Seoul to train Emirati armed forces. More surprisingly heads of state may 
even become involved in details of organization. In the run-up to the final 
3 The National, 13 January 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/south-
korean-elite-forces-arrive-in-uae. 
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decision Mr Sarkozy intervened to bring EDF into the French consortium, 
alongside Areva and GDF-Suez. On the Korean side, Mr Lee behaved like 
a commander-in-chief hectoring and encouraging his troops (Chevalier & 
Park, 2010). He intervened repeatedly in the preparatory stages of the pro-
ject and negotiations to seal the contract.
State involvement at the highest level in nuclear export contracts results in 
companies rallying round the flag. Consortiums are national. Unlike major 
gas and oil infrastructure projects, they do not field companies from all 
over the world, which choose to make a joint bid for a tender on the basis 
of their respective affinities and complementary assets. This inevitably 
means nuclear consortiums are less competitive. Despite being less effec-
tive in terms of costs or know-how a civil engineering firm or own-equip-
ment manufacturer may nevertheless be co-opted because, like the other 
members of the team, it is French, South Korean, Japanese or Russian. 
State intervention is not necessarily an advantage for the vendors either. 
It forces them to reduce their margin, sometimes excessively. As a large 
nuclear contract attracts considerable media attention, any head of state is 
very keen it should be awarded to his or her country, in the hope of basking 
in the glory of successful national firms, particularly as an election cam-
paign approaches. To clinch the deal a head of state may push the national 
consortium to offer the buyer more favourable terms and prices. It is par-
ticularly easy to exert such pressure when, as is often the case, nuclear 
companies are wholly or partly state-owned. The shareholder in person 
orders senior management to make do with a pitiful margin, or even to sell 
at a loss. The winner of a tender is often the biggest loser!
So on the one hand the consortium needs the diplomatic, financial and 
strategic support of its state apparatus, but on the other hand this may 
come at a high price.
When it comes to political intervention Russia leads the pack. Civilian 
nuclear exports are a priority for this country. Much as most gas and oil 
exporting countries it has very little industry which can compete on the 
export market. It must rely on raw materials. There is no manufacturing 
sector which can compete in global markets with top international firms. 
The only exception is nuclear power. In this field Russia possesses consider-
able scientific and technical skills, a range of recently designed, powerful 
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reactor models, and dense industrial fabric. Russian leaders see the export 
of nuclear technology as a matter of national pride and a source of great 
prestige. Above all it helps to achieve their diplomatic and strategic goals. 
The Russian reactors sold abroad are pieces on a global checkboard. In 
1995 Russia carried on the job started by Siemens, building a reactor at 
Bushehr in Iran, on the shore of the Persian Gulf. After a whole series of 
setbacks it was finally connected to the grid in 2013. The Russians lost a 
great deal of money on this scheme. In the same part of the world they 
won a contract with Turkey in the late-2000s for the construction of four 
reactors. Moscow is funding the whole project, drawing to a large extent, 
if not wholly, on the federal budget4. This subsidy makes perfect sense 
when seen in the larger context of Russian gas interests. Turkey agreed to 
allow the projected South Stream gas pipeline to run through its territo-
rial waters. In so doing it changed sides, withdrawing its earlier support 
from the rival Nabucco project, backed by the European Union. The sale 
of Russian reactors to Vietnam at the end of the 2010s was also sweetened 
by advantageous financial terms, this time in the form of export cred-
its. Vietnam has long been a Russian ally in Southeast Asia, particularly 
on the military front. For nuclear vendors from France, Japan or South 
Korea, Russia is a particularly tough competitor, the authorities being pre-
pared to invest massively to facilitate reactor exports. Thanks to its gas 
rent Russia’s pockets are well lined. French, Japanese and South Korean 
heads of state are keen to help their nuclear companies win large con-
tracts abroad, but they do not enjoy the same latitude as Vladimir Putin, 
nor are their arms so heavily laden with gifts.
State intervention obviously plays a key role in importing countries. 
Reactor vendors have two customers: the utility which will be operating 
the nuclear power plant, and the state. It is often more important to win 
over the latter, particularly if it is the former’s only shareholder. The polit-
ical dimension which dominates the importer’s choice of a reactor vendor 
is manifest in mutually agreed bilateral agreements. For example China 
and Vietnam did not organize an open call for tenders prior to choosing 
the plants they purchased from Rosatom in the late-2000s. An opaque 
selection process enables government to exercise its political and strategic 
4 In 2012 State-owned Rosatom received an initial payment of $750 million. This sum 
was taken out of the national budget, as a share in the assets of the company spe-
cially created to build, own and operate the NPP at Akkuyu.
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preferences more freely and obtain often unavowable forms of compensa-
tion. Allowing an electric utility to organize an international call for ten-
ders substantially reduces government’s discretionary powers. However, 
in some cases the transparency and competitive openness of the tendering 
process is merely a front. What really counts is not the score awarded by 
the expert committee which analyzes the bids, but the opinion of govern-
ment. It may choose the losing party. Or the loser may be brought back into 
the running for equally political reasons. China opted to base its first four 
third-generation reactors on Westinghouse’s AP 1000, not Areva’s EPR. But 
it nevertheless ordered two EPRs from the firm shortly afterwards. 
2.2. The oil and gas industry as a future model?
Taking the oil and gas supplies and service industry as its model would 
make the nuclear industry truly international (Locatelli & Mancini, 2012). 
This industry comprises the firms which supply the infrastructure for oil 
and gas exploration and production. It is cited here as an example of the 
engineering, procurement and construction industry, commonly known 
as EPC. It covers the whole supply chain which contributes to delivery of 
an oil rig or refinery, but in a broader context refers to any major indus-
trial installation. So it can equally well apply to nuclear power plant con-
struction projects, which involve drawing up an overall plan, adapting 
to a given site, purchasing hundreds of thousands of parts and the cor-
responding services to implement the project, and of course its overall 
completion. Who does what in this huge puzzle depends on the specific 
contracts, customers and suppliers. Some buyers just want to take pos-
session of a turnkey project. In this case it will be delivered by a single 
contractor, as is the case with the plant supplied by Areva at Olkiluoto 
in Finland. It may also be the work of a consortium comprising various 
contractors, as with the Barakah plant in the UAE. Other buyers want 
separate contracts for the various parts of the job, for instance making 
a distinction between the nuclear island and the conventional generat-
ing units. In this case the customer must take charge of, or delegate to a 
design office, the coordination of the various contractors and their respec-
tive work packages. The utility may also opt to draw up a large number of 
supply contracts, acting as its own architect and engineer, as EDF has done 
at Flamanville, France. Or alternatively it may hire an outside service pro-
vider. The diversity of approaches to project management is no different 
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in oil engineering, procurement and construction. Firms such as Technip, 
Halliburton or Schlumberger organize themselves in much the same way 
depending on the circumstances and the demands of the oil companies for 
which they are working. What is strikingly different in the nuclear indus-
try is the uniformity of the national colours flown by individual compa-
nies making up a consortium, and most of their main customers. Russian 
firms work primarily for Russian utilities; the same is true in Japan; and 
so, and so forth. Basically the nuclear industry is not a global industry 
selling to customers all over the world, working with similarly diverse 
partners and suppliers. In oil engineering, procurement and construction 
issues related to national politics are only apparent on the demand side, 
as the world’s largest oil companies are publicly owned, from Saudi Arabia 
to Venezuela, through Norway and Russia.
So could the supply side of the nuclear industry become a multinational 
undertaking? Could the various companies open up to foreign, private 
capital, form alliances which disregard their nationality, and cast off the 
yoke of domestic politics? Or in other words could the nuclear industry 
take its cue from oil engineering, procurement and construction, rather 
than mimicking defence procurement? 
2.3. International alliances
Two examples the Korean-US alliance in the UAE and the Franco-Japanese 
partnership in Turkey suggest this may be possible. 
The consortium which won the UAE tender was not exclusively South 
Korean (Berthélemy & Lévêque, 2011). Westinghouse, headquartered in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is part of the team, supplying parts, technical 
and engineering services, and licensing its intellectual property. Toshiba, 
which holds a majority share in the US firm, is also involved. The con-
tract does not explain its role, but it will be supplying equipment as a sub-
contractor for Doosan. The South Korean companies did not have much 
option but to accept the presence of these two partners. As they are not 
yet fully independent regarding technology, they needed Westinghouse’s 
agreement. But in turn the latter needed to be authorized by both the US 
Administration, which controls exports of nuclear equipment, and by its 
Japanese shareholder. Without the agreement of these two parties, South 
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Korea stood no chance of honouring an export contract. But the US and 
Toshiba used this bargaining power to their economic advantage. Over and 
above such legal considerations, US involvement also brought the South 
Korean bid a valuable political endorsement to counter the French offer. 
Indeed the project to build the nuclear power plant started life as a mutual 
agreement between France and the UAE. The latter’s decision to issue an 
international call for tenders came as a surprise, marking the beginning 
of the end for the French consortium led by Areva. The US purportedly 
had a hand in this volte-face. It was bound to take an interest in a nuclear 
project in the Gulf, opposite Iran. The US has a very strong presence in 
the UAE, with about 2,000 military and 30,000 residents, some of whom 
hold key positions in civilian nuclear power5. The tender reshuffled the 
cards and brought General Electric into the game, through its joint ven-
ture with Hitachi, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy. Washington would no doubt 
have rather General Electric had been awarded the contract, but it soon 
emerged that its bid was more expensive than the others. At which point 
US support switched to the Korean option.
The order, which has yet to be finalized by Turkey, is for a medium-sized 
Atmea reactor, designed by Areva and Mitshubishi Heavy Industries. 
The consortium is led by the Japanese firm and also comprises Itochu, 
a Japanese fuel supplier, and the French energy company GDF-Suez. The 
latter, which operates Belgium’s nuclear fleet and boasts a highly quali-
fied team of nuclear engineers, took an early interest in the new reactor. 
Acting as both architect and engineer it hoped to build and operate one in 
France, but it ran into opposition from the government and trade unions 
at EDF. As well as being a potential buyer, it has also positioned itself as a 
partner in future consortiums, when the customer wants plant operation 
to be entrusted to an experienced nuclear generating company, at least for 
the first few years. GDF-Suez has taken on this role for the Turkish project. 
Japan has several companies with experience in this field, but never over-
seas. Furthermore their financial predicament has been very challenging 
since the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, not to mention the stain on their 
reputation. Parliamentary inquiries have shown that Tokyo Electric Power 
5 Before the tender, former NRC Director-General William Travers was the Executive 
Director of the Emirati authority. He contributed to framing Abu Dhabi’s nuclear 
strategy. David F. Scott is on the board of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 
which will be operating the plants.
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was not the only Japanese operator to cut corners on safety in the past 
(Gundersen, 2012). The bid for the project in Turkey was however largely 
Japanese, not Franco-Japanese as the French media rather hastily claimed. 
Indeed the agreement was sealed by the President Tayyip Erdogan and 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with no French representatives to be seen. 
This project is nevertheless much closer to oil engineering, procurement 
and construction than its UAE counterpart, the political dimension hav-
ing played a much smaller part on both sides of the deal. All the firms in 
the consortium are privately owned6 and two-nation alliance is the result 
of a strategy based on industrial cooperation on a new reactor model, not 
some legal obligation.
CONCLUSION: THE CONDITIONS 
FOR GLOBALISATION
However one swallow does not make a summer. These alliances, between 
US and South Korean, or French and Japanese companies, are not the first 
signs of a shift towards multinational consortiums exporting nuclear 
power plants. At least not in the immediate future. A change of this 
nature is not on the cards, for it would have to satisfy several improb-
able conditions. The national character of most bids is due to the diplo-
matic and geopolitical stakes for nuclear power. We have seen how gov-
ernment meddles in these contracts, on both sides of the bargaining table. 
If only with respect to the risk of proliferation the stakes will remain 
just as high. For nuclear companies keen to export their technology, col-
laboration with government – and the collective game they must conse-
quently play – is all the more critical, given that the firms are dependent 
on domestic orders. It would make no sense to take the risk of undermin-
ing their position at home in exchange for a few sales abroad, as part of 
multinational consortiums disapproved of by government. Only compa-
nies confronted with a moribund domestic market have sufficient latitude 
to break loose. Substantial growth of the international market, driven 
by widespread adoption of nuclear power or the opening up of protected 
6 The French state owns a 36.7% stake in GDF-Suez but in this capacity has no say in 
the firm’s international development policy, unlike EDF in which it holds an 84.5% 
share.
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home markets, would certainly encourage the formation of multinational 
consortiums. But hopes of a nuclear renaissance are fading and the main 
domestic markets, in China, Russia and even South Korea, are closed. As 
long as the export market for nuclear power plants remains so restricted, 
there is little likelihood of the industry developing in the same way as its 
oil counterpart. Finally a change of paradigm of this sort would require 
massive industrial reorganization. The global nuclear industry is still dom-
inated by vertically integrated companies, spanning the entire cycle, such 
as Areva, Rosatom, China Nuclear Power and even Korea Electric Power7. 
Furthermore these companies are wholly or partly under state control. 
It seems unlikely that a subsidiary specializing in fuel preparation, reac-
tor design, engineering or operation would go it alone and join a consor-
tium. Such a move would mean joining forces with foreign competitors of 
its fellow subsidiaries. Why should the mother company’s management 
and shareholders encourage behaviour of this sort? You can count the 
potential candidates for creating international consortiums on the fingers 
of one hand. They are all private companies, with limited vertical inte-
gration and an almost non-existent home market: General Electric and 
Westinghouse in the US, GDF-Suez a company with international interests 
and the incumbent operator of Belgium’s nuclear fleet, and maybe one or 
two Japanese firms.
To conclude it is likely that the organizing of the nuclear export industry 
will largely remain nationaly-based and shaped by national domestic and 
foreign policies. As a consequence, one may infer some performance losses 
in terms of cost minimizing and innovation. Instead of gathering the best 
complementary firms in the world, the organising of consortia will con-
tinue to be constrained by the passport issuance of companies.
7 The Korean case is unusual in the sense that the longstanding publicly owned 
monopoly was split into various units, including KHNP, which operates hydraulic 
and nuclear power plants. It was due to be privatized, but a change of government 
derailed this plan and all the subsidiaries, including numerous firms involved in 
nuclear power, are still wholly owned by Kepco, in which the state holds a majority 
stake. 
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